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Is THAT "WHOOSH" YOU HEAR A NEW
WHISPER-JET WHISKING ACROSS U.S. SKIES, OR
THE PEROTVIAN "SUCKING-SOUND" OF JOBS
LEAVING THE COUNTRY?
A REVIEW OF THE IMPACT OF US-EU OPEN
SKIES AGREEMENT NEGOTIATIONS ON THE
LEVERAGE, LIFESTYLE, AND LEGAL STANDING
OF U.S. AVIATION LABOR
Lawrence J. Kelly*
I. OVERVIEW: THE GOALS OF THE NEW AGREEMENT, ITS
CHANGE TO THE NATURE OF COMMERCIAL AVIATION,
AND THE RESULTANT EFFECTS ON LABOR
FTER four years of difficult negotiations,1 the United States, the
twenty-seven Member States of the European Union, and the
European Community signed an historic, first stage, 2 compre-
*Former member of Airline Management and Captain, Dallas Texas, Research Fel-
low, Law Institute of the America's (SMU, Dallas, Texas)
1. See Charles A. Hunnicut, Introductory Note on the U.S. -EU OpenSkies Agree-
ment, 46 I.L.M. 467 (2007). As pointed out in Josh Cavinato, Note, Turbulence in
the Airline Industry: Rethinking America's Foreign Ownership Restrictions, 81 S.
CAL. L. REV. 311, n. 48 (2008) (internal citations omitted):
"The EU ultimately agreed to a First Stage Air Transport Agreement
with the United States that did not include an outright removal of the
[U.S.] ownership and control restrictions. Rather, the Agreement in-
cluded a provision that 'ownership by nationals of a Member State or
States of 50% or more of the total equity of a US airline shall not be
presumed to constitute control of that airline. Such ownership shall be
considered on a case-by-case basis.' European negotiators were disap-
pointed that the deal did not remove the 25 percent voting stock cap on
U.S. airline ownership. The EU governments, however, reserved the
right to later restrict U.S. airline access to its airports, or to withdraw
from the Agreement altogether, should the United States not agree to
further liberalization, particularly involving foreign ownership. The
Agreement enters into force on March 30, 2008, with second-stage nego-
tiations beginning no later than May 30, 2008."
See also John R. Crook, United States and European Union Conclude "OpenSkies"
Agreement, 101 AM. J. INT'L L. 653 (2007).
2. For copy of the OpenSkies Agreement see Air Transport Agreement, U.S.-EU,
Mar. 2, 2007, 46 I.L.M. 470, available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organiza-
tion/81623.pdf [hereinafter Open Skies Agreement]. As contemplated by Article
21(3) of the Open Skies Agreement:
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hensive Air Transport Agreement on April 30, 2007 (the "Open Skies
Agreement" or "Agreement") to fundamentally alter the rules and the
very nature of international air law and commerce.3 This Agreement, ef-
fective on March 30, 2008, markedly liberalizes (currently on a provi-
sional, first-stage basis) the rules governing routes, capacity, and fares 4
"The Parties shall review their progress towards a second stage agree-
ment no later than 18 months after the date when the negotiations are
due to start in accordance with paragraph 1. If no second stage agree-
ment has been reached by the Parties within twelve months of the start
of the review, each Party reserves the right thereafter to suspend rights
specified in this Agreement. Such suspension shall take effect no sooner
than the start of the International Air Transport Association (IATA)
traffic season that commences no less than twelve months after the date
on which notice of suspension is given."
Second-stage negotiations began in May 2008.
3. Id.
4. Valuable Open Skies Benefits: The Agreement would authorize every U.S. and
every EU airline to:
" fly between every city in the European Union and every city in the
United States;
" operate without restriction on the number of flights, aircraft, and
routes;
" set fares according to market demand; and
* enter into cooperative arrangements, including codesharing, franchis-
ing, and leasing.
In addition, the Agreement fosters enhanced regulatory cooperation in regard to
competition law, government subsidies, the environment, consumer protection,
and security. It establishes a consultative Joint Committee through which the U.S.
and the EU can resolve questions and further develop areas of cooperation.
Investment Measures: The Open Skies Plus framework of the Agreement would:
* Allow U.S. investors to invest in a European Community airline, as
long as the airline is majority owned and effectively controlled by a
member state and/or nationals of member states;
* ... [make] clear that, under U.S. law, EU investors may hold up to 49.9
percent of the total equity in U.S. airlines, and on a case-by-case basis
even more... ;
* ... [Open] the possibility for EU investors to own or control airlines
from Switzerland, Lichtenstein, members of the European Common
Aviation Area (ECAA), Kenya, and America's Open Skies partners in
Africa without putting at risk such airlines' rights to operate to the
United States; and lastly,
.. .[G]rant new traffic rights to EU carriers... [that would open] the
door to cross-border airline mergers and acquisitions within the EU,
which is possible today only if airlines are prepared to place their in-
ternational operating rights in legal jeopardy.
Other Benefits: The Agreement erects a pro-growth, pro-competitive ... frame-
work that would:
" [Eliminate] outmoded restrictive arrangements affecting London
Heathrow airport, where U.S.-[British] service is now limited to only
four airlines;
" [Allow] EU airline transport of non-DOD USG passengers (employ-
ees and civilian-agency-funded contractors) and cargo on scheduled
and charter flights between two foreign points and on all U.S.-EU
routes not covered by a GSA "city pair" contract; and
" [Allow] EU airline transport of cargo between the United States and
all third (non-EU) countries, and transport of passengers between the
United States and members of the ECAA as of the date of signature of
the Agreement.
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from the standards and limits followed since the inception of the Interna-
tional Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) as a U.N. body to develop
international standards for aviation, and the legal foundation establishing
the rights of international air transport (Freedoms of the Air) established
at the Chicago Convention of 1944.5 The Open Skies Agreement also
replaces each of the separate and varied existing bilateral agreements be-
tween the United States and EU member states with a single document
that controls air transport and commerce between the United States and
all twenty-seven EU Member States. 6 The goal professed by the U.S.
Department of State for the Agreement is "significant economic benefit
for America and Europe."'7 The State Department declares:
This pro-growth, pro-competition, pro-consumer agreement is a ma-
jor breakthrough in transatlantic economic relations. The Agree-
ment represents a 'win/win' for consumers, airlines, and communities
on both sides of the Atlantic: increasing travel and transport options,
catalyzing trade and employment growth, and enhancing people-to-
people contacts. Consumers on both sides of the Atlantic will benefit
from new air services that were not permitted in the past.8
The U.S.-EU Open Skies Agreement fits in generally with U.S. trade pol-
icy calling for a greater liberalization in international trade and invest-
ment, 9 and specifically for greater liberalization in the area of
international transportation services.' 0
U.S. Dep't of State Fact Sheet No. 2007/340, U.S.-EU Air Transport Agreement
(Apr. 30, 2007), www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2007/apr/83982.htm.
5. See Convention Between the United States of American and Other Governments
Respecting International Civil Aviation, Dec. 7, 1944, 61 Stat. 1180, 15 U.N.T.S.
295, available at http://www.icao.int/icaonet/arch/doc/7300/7300_orig.pdf [hereinaf-
ter Chicago Convention] (which established the ICAO). For background discus-
sion of the Chicago Convention and ICAO, see BIN CHENG, THE LAW OF
INTERNATIONAL AIR TRANSPORT 499 (George W. Keeton & Georg
Schwarzenberger eds., Stevens and Sons Ltd. 1962).
6. See OpenSkies Agreement, supra note 2, Art. 22, Annex 1 (lists the fifteen bilat-
eral agreements affected).
7. U.S. Dep't of State Fact Sheet, supra note 4.
8. See U.S. Dep't of State Media Note No. 2008/233, U.S.-EU Air Transport Agree-
ment Becomes Effective March 30 (Mar. 28, 2008), http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/
2008/mar/102778.htm.
9. U.S. Dep't of State Fact Sheet, The U.S. Commitment to Global Free Trade (June
23, 2006), http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/68400.pdf.
10. See, e.g., Multilateral Agreement on the Liberalization of International Air Trans-
portation, May 1, 2001, http://www.maliat.govt.nz (signed by Brunei Darussalam,
Chile, New Zealand, Singapore, and the United States); see also U.S. Dep't of
State Media Note No. 2007/182, U.S. Signs OpenSkies Aviation Agreement with
Canada, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2007/mar/81645.htm (this Agreement was
signed March 12, 2007); and, as part of the ongoing NAFTA process among the
U.S., Canada, and Mexico, negotiations began in 2007 for a U.S.-Canada-Mexico
OpenSkies agreement, see U.S. Dep't of Transp. Office of Pub. Affairs, U.S., Ca-
nada, Mexico Aim to Liberalize Air Transport in 10 Years, (Apr. 27, 2007), http://
www.america.gov/stltexttransenglish/2007/May/20070502164852xjsnommisO.78086
49.html. Also, it should be kept in mind that the predecessors to the U.S.-EU
Agreement were fifteen bilateral OpenSkies Agreements with various EU Mem-
ber States.
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The stated goals for the Agreement are laudable, but this first step of
international deregulation (and its intended follow-on agreements) so
completely changes the international commercial aviation regulatory
structure of the past six decades that achievement of its intended goals
cannot be certain. It is the first comprehensive deregulation of interna-
tional airline capacity since the United States acquiesced to prevailing
ICAO member preference for restricted market access that was less than
complete "Freedom of the Air."'I
The U.S.-EU Open Skies Air Transport Agreement begins with the
declaration that it is moving away from the prevailing status quo by open-
ing access to markets. 12 It departs from the governmental constriction on
capacity promoted by the British as "Order in the air" in 1944, and
adopted in practice if not always in proclamation by the U.S. and ICAO
members since 1950.13 Open Skies embodies the new philosophy that
open access is now the proper approach to maximize benefits for consum-
ers, airlines, labor, and communities on both sides of the Atlantic. 14 The
Agreement goes further to recognize the importance of "enhancing the
access of their airlines to global capital markets" in order to support in-
creased competition. 15
As stated in its twenty six articles and five annexes, the Agreement
promotes an international aviation system based on competition among
airlines in the market place with minimum government interference and
regulation; facilitates the expansion of international air transport oppor-
tunities to include allowing new routes and frequencies; makes it possible
for airlines to offer the traveling and shipping public competitive prices
and services in open markets; and it intends to have all sectors of the air
transport industry, including airline workers, operate under a liberalized
agreement, while recognizing serious threats to aircraft security and en-
suring the highest degree of safety and security in international air
transport.' 6
The Agreement does acknowledge the Chicago Convention on Inter-
national Civil Aviation of 1944, but emphasizes a free market for global
commercial aviation and asserts that "government subsidies may ad-
versely affect airline competition and may jeopardize the basic objectives
of the Agreement.' 17
Additionally, the Agreement now adds to the basis of the Chicago
Convention, the "importance of protecting the environment in develop-
ing and implementing international aviation policy" 8 as well as "the im-
11. CHENG, supra note 5, at 20-21.
12. U.S.-EU Air Transport Agreement, Apr. 30, 2007, USA/CE/en 6, http://www.state.
gov/documents/organization/84338.pdf.
13. See CHENG, supra note 5, at 21-26.
14. Id.
15. U.S.-EU Air Transport Agreement, supra note 12, at USA/CE/en6.
16. U.S.-EU Air Transport Agreement, supra note 12, at USA/CE/en 4-5.
17. Id. at USA/CE/en 5.
18. Id. at USA/CE/en 6.
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portance of protecting consumers, including the protections afforded by
the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for International
Carriage by Air, done at Montreal May 28, 1999."19 Ambitiously, the
Agreement intends, beyond its practical applications to aviation, to have
this "crucial economic sector" set a "precedent of global significance to
promote the benefits of liberalization." 20
But it is possible that the most significant outcomes from the Agree-
ment may prove to be the unintended outcomes from such a dramatic
change. The deregulation of domestic U.S. aviation in 1978 was a sudden
and diametric change of comparable proportions. Many, including the
founders of domestic U.S. airline deregulation, would argue that it
wrought unexpected and undesirable outcomes. 21 Until 1978 the U.S. do-
mestic airline service under the control of the Civil Aeronautics Board
(CAB) essentially paralleled ICAO philosophy of regulating routes and
frequencies to control capacity. Commercial air transport was treated as
a capital-intensive, vital national resource for commerce. Government
controls on the market were considered necessary to ensure stable service
gained by restricting capacity to levels which generally retarded competi-
tive pressures to operate networks with unprofitable pricing or customer
levels, or subsidized specified services which might be unsustainable
under open-market conditions. 22 The CAB could shelter owners from
the hazards of unbridled competition, and afforded its labor groups the
leverage to demand participation in the profits a protected market as
well.
This paper explores how the new Open Skies Agreement and its in-
tended supplements might affect the leverage, lifestyle, and legal standing
of labor in U.S. aviation. The 1978 U.S. domestic aviation deregulation
provides a good indicator for what one can expect the effects of interna-
tional liberalization to be on the financial success and customer service of
the U.S. aviation industry as a whole, and on its labor in particular.
While deregulation of the U.S. market has increased the number of
cities with commercial jet service and lowered prices overall, it has also
overtaxed the physical and human capacity of the system and destroyed
the financial security of nearly every carrier in the industry. Given the
goals of the Agreement to increase competition and expand markets, it is
unlikely the current system can handle such increases without corre-
sponding increases and improvements in the capacity of the air traffic
system, airports, and the skilled labor that keep such huge capital invest-
ments productive. Section IV below will detail some indications that the




21. See THOMAS PETZINGER JR., HARD LANDING (Times Business 1996); see also
BARBARA STURKEN PETERSON & JAMES GLAB, RAPID DESCENT, DEREGULATION
AND THE SHAKEOUT IN THE AIRLINES (Simon & Schuster 1994).
22. See PETZINGER, supra note 21; see also PETERSON & GLAB, supra note 21.
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The Agreement also lists a goal of maximizing benefits for labor. 23
Historically, though, opening restricted markets to new production
sources with lower cost labor has depressed the wages and benefits of the
formerly protected, more affluent workers. In recent years, such trans-
fers have occurred not only at levels of textile or automotive manufactur-
ing, but in highly educated skilled positions in computer and
telecommunications engineering, 24 and increasingly in legal research. 25 It
is possible the experiences of these industries may also be indicative of
what lies ahead for U.S. aviation workers.
Traditionally, airline labor was able to demand participation in the con-
trolled profits of regulated carriers. Extreme cutthroat competition as
seen in the United States since deregulation in 1978 has decimated the
financial security of the carriers and thus its workers as well. The Open
Skies Agreement does not present any novel legal or commercial struc-
ture which indicates that liberalizing air travel between the United States
and the European Union will avoid accelerating similar losses on a
broader scale.
When U.S. routes and pricing were regulated, the costs of labor pay
and benefits could more easily be passed on to the consumer than is the
case in a highly competitive market without restriction to new entrants.
Open Skies is intended to eliminate route restrictions and allow a theo-
retically unlimited combination of city pairs served by an unlimited num-
ber of carriers providing service between the United States and the
European Union. The Agreement's proposed second stage intends to al-
low "cabotage" (allowing foreign carriers to fly domestic routes in other
nations) which will expand unlimited rights to fly between cities within
the United States. But there are actually physical restraints on the availa-
bility of landing and parking slots at desired destinations, as well as limits
on the production volume of new aircraft and the current number of li-
censed pilots to fly them. The United States Federal Aviation Adminis-
tration (FAA), ICAO, foreign governments, and the International Air
Transport Association (IATA) are taking steps to increase the capacity
and supply in these areas. The specifics of these programs, and whether
they effectively meet growing demand, will have great impact on the mar-
ketability and leverage of the current U.S. government air traffic control-
lers and commercial airline labor force.
It is important to note that as monumental as this new Agreement's
liberalization of traffic across the North Atlantic is, the ICAO's goal is
greater than just U.S.-EU Open Skies. ICAO desires liberalization
agreements within two years which will expand allowance of foreign di-
rect investment, and allow for complete access by foreign air carriers to
23. See U.S.-EU Air Transport Agreement, supra note 12, Arts. 18, 21.
24. Om Malik, Telecom's Continuing Death Spiral, GIAOM, June 13, 2004, http://
gigaom.com/2004/06/13/telecoms-continuing-death-spiral.
25. Joy London & Ron Friedmann, Developments in Legal Outsourcing and Offshor-
ing, Law and Technology Resources for Legal Professionals, Nov. 22, 2006, http://
www.llrx.com/features/legaloutsourcing.htm.
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all routes within the United States,26 rights known to ICAO members as
the 8th degree of Freedom, or cabotage. 27 Admittedly, one cannot pre-
dict the outcome of a future expansion purely based on a trend line of
past events, but if the new Agreement seeks to broaden the changes
brought by domestic deregulation, then lacking a counterbalancing
change and improvement in other systemic features, an outcome other
than more-of-the-same, is unlikely.
Using the 2008 U.S.-EU Open Skies Agreement as the primary refer-
ence point, this article explores potential significant factors in the move-
ment to globally deregulate the aviation service of the United States, how
they may be expected to benefit safety, service, security, availability, and
cost, and whether that will ultimately benefit or harm the leverage and
lifestyle of the current aviation labor force. In doing so, Part II will re-
view the economic and legal basis of why global aviation was regulated,
and how U.S. aviation labor leverage and law developed in a system that
essentially modeled the original ICAO "Order in the air" philosophy.
Part III takes a closer look at the goals and details of the Open Skies
Agreement, and how treaty law may affect the existing protections or
leverage provided to U.S. labor by the existing domestic law presented in
part II. Then in Part IV, the genesis and effects of U.S. domestic deregu-
lation is explored. This part looks at the financial condition of the air-
lines, and its affect on labor as well as the capability of the government to
adequately support and monitor an unregulated market. Part V presents
concluding observations.
In the near term, it is likely that an expansion of carrier or route op-
tions will increase the existing pressures on U.S. air carriers to depress
costs and benefits while operating on the edge of insolvency in a competi-
tive frenzy for market presence. Consolidations will accelerate as the
laws allow. But in the longer term, as the Second Stage of the U.S.-EU
Agreement and other complimentary global liberalizations are enacted,
the potential increases that global aviation may adopt a common shipping
industry method of avoiding taxes and labor regulations by restructuring
the ownership and dominion of carriers who will base headquarters and
labor supplies in foreign countries providing "flags of convenience. ' 28 So
long as technical, physical, and structural supports are enhanced to sup-
port expanded demand, and adequate quantity and quality of skilled la-
bor is available, then this bold liberalization should successfully "shrink
the world" by magnifying the service of impact of this critical industry.
But current trends make fruition of such premises and outcome far from
certain.
26. Robert Coffman, Global Deregulation, U.S.EU OpenSkies and You, FLIGHTLINE
20 (Fall 2007), available at http://www.alliedpilots.org/Public/Publications/Flight
line/FLFa112007-Public.pdf.
27. CHENG, supra note 5, at 15.
28. See BOLESLAW ADAM BOCZEK, FLAGS OF CONVENIENCE: AN INTERNATIONAL LE-
GAL STUDY (Harvard University Press 1962).
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II. WHAT IS BEING ALTERED: THE STATUS QUO-AN
OVERVIEW OF LAW CONTROLLING AIR TRAVEL
AND LABOR PRIOR TO 2008
Familiarity with formative international aviation law, and with U.S.
statutes controlling rights for labor in aviation, is instructive before ana-
lyzing the impact of the U.S.-EU Air Transport Agreement treaty taking
force in March 2008 and its Second Stage being negotiated for enactment
in 2010.
From the earliest days of commercial aviation, international air carrier
financial liabilities were limited in order to assure profitability and thus
encourage investment in the industry. In the United States, labor laws
were passed in order to ensure that a willing supply of skilled aviators
would enter and remain in an industry which possessed labor-manage-
ment relations balanced enough to minimize disruptions of service in air
transport. As the industry developed, laws intended to maintain a bal-
ance between workers' rights and profitable business opportunities for
airline expansion or survival were directly superseded by or politically
influenced by U.S. antitrust and bankruptcy laws.
While U.S. laws have been applied to balance rights of workers and
owners to enhance stability and profitability in commercial aviation, the
increasing globalization of markets in the past decade has increased the
role of international collaborations such as the Organisation for Eco-
nomic Co-Operation and Development (OECD) to enhance a similar
balance between labor opportunity and rights and owner profit opportu-
nities within and across foreign borders. The OECD promulgates Em-
ployment and Industrial Relations Guidelines for Multinational
Enterprises. 29
The premier guideline of international aviation until the revolution of
Open Skies has been the Chicago Convention of 1944.30 The Chicago
Convention and its supplements have controlled access to routes, fre-
quencies, and fares to provide an "order in the air" to ensure the devel-
opment of reasonably stable and profitable international air service. 31
A. INTERNATIONAL REGULATION FOR PROTECTION: THE WARSAW
CONVENTION OF 1929/1933
The Warsaw Convention laid the foundation for cooperative interna-
tional regulation of aviation. In the burgeoning days of commercial avia-
tion, the uncertainty in the reliability and safety of air travel was
expressed by a phrase well known across Europe: "The layman flies, the
29. See Donald J. Johnston, The Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Devel-
opment Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises Revision 2000, § 4-5 (2000), http:I
www.oecd.orgldataoecd/56/36/1922428.pdf.
30. See Chicago Convention, supra note 5.
31. CHENG, supra note 5, at 21.
2008 US-EU OPEN SKIES AGREEMENT
expert takes the train."'32 To overcome such fear and bias, and to pro-
mote the benefits of aviation as a valuable resource for commerce worthy
of investment and development as a major industry, thirty-two nations
joined together to create a uniform and predictable legal regime with
standards for operation and protection from potential devastating liabili-
ties associated with an aircraft crash.33 The United States attended as an
observer.34 The successful product of their efforts became a binding
treaty in February of 1933 known as The Convention for the Unification
of Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage by Air.35 Because
the collaboration began in Warsaw, Poland in 1929, this multinational
treaty is commonly referred to simply as the Warsaw Convention. The
treaty is uncommon in that it does not principally bind national govern-
ments, but directly affects the legal rights of private human and corporate
persons. 36
Today, 190 nations are signatories of the Warsaw Convention,37 mak-
ing it the single most accepted private law treaty in history. Over the
years it has seen many adjustments to adapt to the changing role and
success of international transportation and commerce. 38 The most sub-
stantial was the Montreal Convention of 1999.39 And although the U.S.
Senate gave the original treaty little discussion before voting their con-
sent in 1934,40 "as a treaty ratified by the U.S. Senate, the Warsaw Con-
vention is the supreme law of the land in the United States, superseding
inconsistent federal or state law, or carrier air waybills or tariffs."'4'
32. History: Between the Wars, International Civil Aviation Organization, http://www.
icao.int//cgi/goto-m.pl?icao/en/hist/history0l.htm (last visited Sept. 4, 2008).
33. Id.
34. PAUL S. DEMPSEY & MICHAEL MILDE, INTERNATIONAL AIR CARRIER LIABILITY:
THE MONTREAL CONVENTION OF 1999 11 (McGill University Centre for Research
in Air & Space Law 2005) (The original thirty-three drafting countries to the treaty
were: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Brazil, China, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Egypt,
Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Japan,
Latvia, Luxemburg, Mexico, Norway, the Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Spain,
Sweden, Switzerland, Union of South Africa, U.S.S.R., Venezuela, and Yugoslavia.
Only twenty-three of these signed the convention in 1929. The United States
merely had an observer and did not sign until 1934.).
35. Id. at 13.
36. See James E. Landry, Swift, Sure and Equitable Recovery - A Developing Concept
in International Aviation Law, 47 N.Y. ST. B.J. 372, 373 (1975).
37. Contracting states of the Warsaw Convention, International Civil Aviation Organi-
zation, http://www.icao.inUcgi/goto-m.pl?cgi/statesDB4.pl?en (last visited Sept. 3,
2008).
38. DEMPSEY & MILDE, supra note 34, at 14.
39. See id.
40. See 78 CONG. REC. 11,577 (1934).
41. DEMPSEY & MILDE, supra note 34, at 14; see also Hill v. United Airlines, 550 F.
Supp. 1048, 1054 (D. Kan. 1982); Saiyed v. Transmediterranean Airways, 509 F.
Supp. 1167, 1169 (D. Mich. 1981); Kahn v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 82 A.D.2d
696, 698 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981).
2008]
708 LAW AND BUSINESS REVIEW OF THE AMERICAS [Vol. 14
B. U.S. LEGISLATION FOR SURVIVAL: THE NATIONAL RAILWAY
LABOR ACT OF 1926/1936
The National Railway Labor Act regulates rights and the process of
labor negotiations for United States commercial aviation. Just as the
Warsaw Convention enhanced the development and expansion of avia-
tion in commerce by providing a unified global standard for liability,
workers in the United States sought legislation which would protect their
livelihood. While the Warsaw Convention provided investors with pre-
dictable liability limits, and thereby facilitated capital investment and job
creation, workers in the United States felt a similar need for a legal
framework which would ensure enough income and work rule security
for them to commit to a career in aviation. The congressional precedents
with the railways provided the foundation for such a legal basis. Recogni-
tion that the railways provided a vital component of continental com-
merce, that the working conditions and hours were unique and
demanding, and that contentious disputes between management and la-
bor that crippled the efficiency of this vital trade did not benefit investors,
customers, management, or labor, produced the Railway Labor Act of
1926.42 It was a heralded law of preemptive compromise produced by
collaboration of leaders in the railway industry management and labor
with the drafting legislators.43
A refining amendment to the Act was passed in 1934 which created the
National Mediation Board (NMB). 44 The Board was given the power to
settle disputes and certify legal representation for labor organizations.45
More frequently the Board functions as imposed arbitrator with compul-
sory authority for minor (disputes over interpretation or implementation
of existing contracts) disputes, and provides a non-binding mediation role
in major (new contract negotiation) disputes. 46 A further amendment in
1936 expanded the Act, and the NMB's responsibilities, to cover not only
railway labor, but airline carriers and their unions as well.47
In U.S. aviation today, if labor and management negotiations on a new
contract reach an impasse with potential for strike, the NMB offers non-
binding arbitration. If either party refuses, after a thirty day cooling off
period, it is legal for labor to strike and it is legal for management to lock-
out labor or impose its own new work rules and compensation. 48 But, if
the NMB deems that such actions by labor or management are likely to
"deprive any section of the country of essential... services, ' '49 it informs
42. See MATTHEW A. KELLY, LABOR AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS: TERMS, LAWS,
COURT DECISIONS, AND ARBITRATION STANDARDS 98-102 (1987).
43. Id. at 98.
44. See 74 Cong. Ch. 6, February 13, (1935), 49 Stat. 22; see also 45 U.S.C.A. § 154
(West 2008).
45. KELLY, supra note 43, at 99.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. 45 U.S.C.A. § 155 (West 2008).
49. 45 U.S.C.A. § 160 (West 2008).
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the President, whom the Railway Labor Act authorizes to appoint an ad
hoc emergency board.50 The Act gives the Presidential Emergency Board
investigative and fact-finding power with rights to subpoena and conduct
public hearings. Within thirty days they must report to the President
(recommendations are neither required nor prohibited). During the pe-
riod of the board's investigation, and for an additional thirty days thereaf-
ter, both labor and management are legally obligated to maintain the
terms of their existing contract. 51
While the regulations of the United States Federal Aviation Adminis-
tration (FAA) do regulate safety and some service related functions in
U.S. aviation, it is the Railway Labor Act that provides the primary legal
structure which governs the opportunity and conduct of U.S. labor orga-
nizations in aviation to influence corporate control over their rates of
pay, work rules, and working conditions. The constitutionality of Con-
gress to create such controls was upheld under the commerce clause of
the constitution in Texas and New Orleans R.R. Co. v. Brotherhood of
Railway and Steamship Clerks, 281 U.S. 548 (1930).
If, after all the provisions for involvement of the NMB have been exer-
cised, an acceptable resolution cannot be reached under the terms of the
Railway Labor Act, and the President or Congress determine that either
a strike action by unions or unfair contract terms imposed by a corpora-
tion may cause unacceptable disruption to interstate commerce, then spe-
cial action by the President or Congress may be required to control the
outcome of the impasse. 52 A diagram of the process is presented below. 53
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. KELLY, supra note 43, at 101.
53. Edgar James, Collective Bargaining: A Refresher Course, FLIGHTLINE, 6 (Winter
2006), http://www.alliedpilots.org/Public/Publications/Flightline/Winter_2006.pdf.
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UNDER THE U.S. RAILWAY LABOR ACT (RLA)
Flightilne W.- 20061200P
C. EARLY U.S. LEGISLATION FOR FREE TRADE:
THE ANTI-TRUST ACTs
The Railway Labor Act exists as but one part of a broader scheme of
labor rights law for U.S. workers. The Sherman Anti-Trust Act of 1890
was not written as a labor law, but it was intended to prevent American
corporations from becoming so powerful that their owners and managers
held inequitable and unfettered controlled over free trade between
states.54 By 1932 it was clear to Congress that legislation was needed to
54. KELLY, supra note 43, at 102
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provide specific equitable rights for workers suffering under the strangle-
hold of big corporate America.55 To counter the court's skewed anti-la-
bor interpretations of the freedom of contract typified in Lochner v. New
York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), and indiscriminate use of the Sherman Antitrust
Act by the courts to impose injunctions against labor organization ac-
tions, Congress passed the Federal Anti-injunction Act, also referred to
as the Norris-LaGuardia Act.
The National Labor Relations Act, also known as the Wagner Act, fol-
lowed in 1935 with the purpose of encouraging adhesion free collective
bargaining.56 Addressing a public policy concern from Ford's first plant
to recent labor actions, the Wagner Act also stated that unequal bargain-
ing power over labor harms the economy overall by aggravating business
depressions due to suppressed purchasing power of the laborers.57
Various other antitrust focused Acts have been passed by Congress
since 1935 which increase or provide balance in the rights of management
and unions in collective bargaining; their ultimate goal being to preclude
"recurrent business depressions by depressing wage rates
and the purchasing power of wage-earners in industry. s58 Notable
among them, was a provision of the Labor-Management Relations (Taft-
Hartley) Act of 1947. Taft-Hartley empowered the President to intervene
in labor disputes which affect a substantial part of an entire industry if the
nation's health and safety are imperiled.5 9 The Taft-Hartley Act also pro-
hibits strikes by federal employees. 60
The application of these laws in the Professional Air Traffic Controllers
Organization strike in the dawning years of U.S. domestic airline deregu-
lation still impacts the opportunities for international deregulation into
the United States as well. Such impact will be discussed in greater detail
when addressing U.S. capacity limits later. While post Railway Labor
Acts do control public perceptions and corporate approaches to labor-
management interactions at private companies involved in interstate
commerce (and do impact commercial aviation), for the railroads and air-
lines themselves, the Railway Labor Act remains preemptive. 61
While such laws are intended to balance powers of contracting parties
and to equalize rights of the opposing interests in labor negotiations, the
U.S. government still holds the ultimate control if it feels interstate com-
merce will be harmed. In March 2001, with labor groups at four different
major U.S. airlines, each approaching impasse in negotiations (as labor
desired an increased share of historic airline profitability to recoup from
previous concessionary contracts), the President of the United States in-
tervened as the thirty day post NMB arbitration cooling off period ended
55. See id. at 102-105.
56. See id. at 105-106.
57. Id. at 107.
58. Id. at 107 (quoting the National Labor Relations Act of 1935).
59. KELLY, supra note 43, at 111.
60. Id. at 110.
61. Id. at 108.
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and prohibited the Airline Mechanics Fraternal Association (AMFA) at
Northwest Airlines from striking. More significantly, the President made
the unprecedented proclamation that he would not allow any labor group
to strike any airline in 2001.62 Similarly, there are other laws which can
be applied to effectively usurp compensation negotiated by labor as well.
D. "SIDESTEPPING" LABOR LAW WITH A STATUTORY "TRUMP" CARD:
BANKRUPTCY LAWS
Shortly after the United States deregulated the airline industry in 1978,
bankruptcy law was used to avoid the protections the Railway Labor Act
was supposed to provide for aviation workers. Just as Congress outlaw-
ing a strike by air traffic controllers undercuts the controllers' leverage in
negotiations, U.S. Bankruptcy laws can place a heavy thumb on the scale
of labor-management equality in negotiations. Significantly impacting
the employees at Continental Airlines, in their 1983 strike in response to
management's unilateral imposition of new contracts immediately follow-
ing declaration of Chapter 11 bankruptcy, was the ruling in NLRB v.
Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513 (1984).63 The Court held that "the lan-
guage 'executory contract' in 11 U. S. C. § 365 (a) of the Bankruptcy
Code includes within it collective-bargaining agreements ... and that the
Bankruptcy Court may approve rejection of such contracts by the debtor-
in-possession upon an appropriate showing." 64 Further, the Court de-
cided "that a debtor-in-possession does not commit an unfair labor prac-
tice when, after the filing of a bankruptcy petition but before court-
approved rejection of the collective-bargaining agreement, it unilaterally
modifies or terminates one or more provisions of the agreement. ' 65 Ef-
fectively, management had the trump card to erase all labor contracts.
Vehement reaction from labor unions across the nation resulted in the
prompt passage of the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship
Act of 1984.66 The Act required an employer to submit proposed
changes to a collective bargaining contract "necessary to permit the reor-
ganization" for bankruptcy court review and approval before implement-
ing. 6 7 The Act has been upheld to preclude rejection of contracts for the
convenience of management and creditors, and to require employers to
conduct good faith negotiations with labor before requesting bankruptcy
court approval of imposed conditions. 68 Still, the most recent bankrupt-
cies of United Airlines and U.S. Airways eliminated over $5 billion in
unfunded retirement benefits.69
62. Bush takes action to block Northwest strike, Cable News Network (March 9, 2001),
http://archives.cnn.com/2001/TRAVEL/NEWS/03/09/northwest.union/.
63. KELLY, supra note 43, at 120.
64. N.L.R.B. v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 516 (1984).
65. Id.
66. 11 U.S.C. § 1113 (1984).
67. Id.
68. KELLY, supra note 43, at 121-2.
69. Jay Etta Z. Hecker & Barbara D. Bovjberg, GAO-05-835T Commercial Aviation:
Preliminary Observations on Legacy Airlines' Financial Condition, Bankruptcy,
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In 2005, the Bankruptcy Judgeship Act and the Bankruptcy Abuse Pre-
vention and Consumer Protection Act further limited management domi-
nance in bankruptcy. 70 The Acts limited retention payments to key
executives in relation to employee pay, and allowed shortening periods
for management exclusivity in planning reorganization and terminating
lease contracts. 7 1 In general, it made bankruptcy an even less desired
option for management to handle financial difficulties. As a result, both
Delta and Northwest Airlines filed for bankruptcy before the 2005 law
took effect.72
E. A TEMPERING INTERNATIONAL INFLUENCE: THE ORGANISATION
FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT (OECD)
EMPLOYMENT AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS GUIDELINES FOR
MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES
In 2000, OECD issued a revision to their non-binding guidelines for its
29 members. 73 The OECD is an international collaboration whose mem-
ber states infuse persuasive influence over the conduct of international
business. Its guidelines attempt to mitigate the difficulty of obtaining in-
ternational consensus establishing binding international law regarding va-
rious factions of commercial enterprise. The OECD's stated goal is "to
achieve the highest sustainable economic growth and employment and a
rising standard of living in Member countries, while maintaining financial
stability, and thus to contribute to the development of the world econ-
omy. '" 74 The guidelines are not a substitute for, nor do they override,
applicable law. But, they may provide a guide for our expectations of
how member states will be inclined to conduct future enterprises.
Thus, although lacking the force of U.S. labor and bankruptcy law, the
OECD guidelines regarding labor relations and employment practices
may restrain the choices acceptable for management in handling labor
relations within U.S. owned airlines, or by foreign owned carriers ex-
panding in the United States. They require honoring workers right to
and Pension Issues 3 (June 22, 2005), available at http://www.gao.govlnew.itemsl
d05835t.pdf.
70. See Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L.
No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (April 20, 2005) (summary of significant changes). available
at http:/Ibankruptcy.cooley.com/Pratt%27s%20JBL%20Article.pdf
71. Carl Jones, New Bankruptcy Law to Have Major Impact on Corporations, DAILY
BUSINESS REVIEW, available at http://www.law.com/jsp/ihc/PubArticlelHC.jsp?id=
1129280714100.
72. Id.
73. Johnston, supra note 29 (The original Member countries of the OECD are Austria,
Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy,
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland,
Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States. The following countries be-
came Members subsequently through accession at the dates indicated hereafter:
Japan 28th April 1964, Finland 28th January 1969, Australia 7th June 1971, New
Zealand 29th May 1973, Mexico 18th May 1994, the Czech Republic 21st Decem-
ber 1995, Hungary 7th May 1996, Poland 22nd November 1996, and Korea 12th
December 1996).
74. Id. at 2
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unionize and bargain collectively. 75 But, discrimination with respect to
employment or occupation of employees is allowed if it furthers estab-
lished governmental policies which specifically promote greater equality
of employment opportunities, or relates to the inherent requirements of a
job.76 Further, the OECD guidelines in Part IV, Employment and Indus-
trial Relations, call for employers to observe standards "not less favour-
able than those observed by comparable employers in the host
country, '77 including "to the greatest extent practicable," 78 employing
and training local personnel.
Sections six and seven of part IV are key regarding major changes to
staffing and scope of operations. Section six requires that any changes by
an enterprise which will have "major effects upon the livelihood of their
employees," 79 particularly one involving collective lay-offs or dismissals,
provide notice to employees and the government in order to allow mitiga-
tion of adverse effects. But perhaps section seven might contain the most
significant limitation for the domestic U.S. airlines competing with lower
cost structured foreign carriers in a post-cabotage United States:
In the context of bona fide negotiations with representatives of em-
ployees on conditions of employment,... not threaten to transfer
the whole or part of an operating unit from the country concerned
nor transfer employees from the enterprises' component entities in
other countries in order to influence unfairly those negotiations or to
hinder the exercise of a right to organise. 80
But again, these words only possess the strength of moral suasion; unlike
the binding commitments of the major international treaties there is no
court that enforces them.
F. "ORDER IN THE AIR"; INTERNATIONAL ROUTES, RATES, AND
SERVICE: THE CHICAGO CONVENTION OF 1944
Even before the Second World War ended, it was apparent to the in-
dustrialized nations that aviation would play a major role in the interna-
tional economic recovery from the war, and that it would also stand as a
symbol and instrument of national policy and strength. 81 The fifty-four
nation signatories who gathered in Chicago sought to guide a post war
expansion of the aviation industry that would be economically sound and
harmoniously respectful of each nation's sovereign status.8 2 To facilitate




79. Id. at 22.
80. Id.
81. CHENG, supra note 5, at 19.
82. Id. at 499 (The signatory nations were: Afghanistan, Australia, Belgium, Bolivia,
Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Columbia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Do-
minican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, France, Lebanon, Libe-
ria, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway,
Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippine Commonwealth, Poland, Portugal, Spain,
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this, they felt that three principal areas of air commerce must have uni-
fied operations: routes, capacity, and tariffs (fares). 83 Many feared that
unrestricted access and capacity, or uncontrolled tariffs would induce cut-
throat competition and strangle the industry before it regained any stable
financial viability. This position was strongly held by the British in their
White Paper on International Civil Aviation.84 As the Warsaw Conven-
tion served the stability of global aviation by limiting liability, the Chi-
cago Convention became the predominate treaty to regulate
international capacity and profitability.
In 1944, the United States was unquestionably the dominant industrial
manufacturing powerhouse of the planet, leading the world in production
of aircraft. In Chicago, the United States unsuccessfully pushed for rela-
tively unrestricted access for all nations in the skies across the globe.
They wanted all nations to be allowed to carry passenger to any other
country, and pick up or discharge any number of passengers and cargo
before continuing the flight on into a second foreign nation (termed the
"fifth freedom" of the air). While such rights were agreed to for non-
scheduled flights,85 only a dozen other nations accepted this broad liber-
alization for scheduled airlines. 86 The Europeans knew they had a geo-
graphic advantage but severe resource limits compared to the United
States. With over nine-tenths of the inhabited planet within a day's flying
time of London, 87 none of the major European nations expecting to fly
the North Atlantic accepted such liberalization. 88
Countering the vision of the United States to allow nearly total free-
dom of the Air, the United Kingdom had pushed for "Order in the air." 89
"Order in the air" was the prevailing (but not drafted into the Conven-
tion) view that regulation of capacity was required for industry stabiliza-
tion. 90 Because international air transport served a role as an instrument
of national policy, many nations heavily subsidized air services and their
national scheduled airline beyond economic justifications. 9' "Order in
the air" would result from rationed capacity and regulated rates.
The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) was founded at
the Chicago Convention of 1944 to foster the planning and development
Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, Turkey, Union of South Africa, United Kingdom,
United States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela, and Yugoslavia).
83. Id. at 9.
84. Id. at 18.
85. Chicago Convention, supra note 5, Art. 5.
86. CHENG, supra note 5, at 602-609.
87. Id. at 3.
88. See id. at 602-609.
89. Id. at 19.
90. Id. at 21 (Order of the air was the British proposed counter position to the U.S.
demand for full Freedom of the Air at Chicago. Four positions overall including
the Canadian and Australian/New Zealand were brought to the Chicago Conven-
tion, for a nice summary of the interaction and resolution among them see I.H.PH.
DIEDERIKS-VERSHOOR, AN INTRODUCTION TO AIR LAW 13-19 (2006)).
91. CHENG, supra note 5, at 19.
2008]
716 LAW AND BUSINESS REVIEW OF THE AMERICAS [Vol. 14
of air transport.92 Post war experience quickly showed even the United
States that unlimited international rights to and beyond foreign countries,
which the United States had pushed for at the Chicago Convention, was
economically undesirable for the industry. 93 By 1947 the United States
withdrew from open allowance for the fifth freedom of the air.94 The
United Kingdom presented the case for "Order in the air" protectionism
to ICAO, claiming it was necessary because:
(d) The drive to eliminate competition in the struggle for supremacy,
leads to artificial inflation of capacity, constant pressure to reduce
fares below economic levels and other competitive devices.
(e) The tendency of each country to surround its international air
transport with a protective ringed fence based on a restrictive policy
in the grant of commercial rights stultifies the full development of
efficient air services on an economical basis. 95
The United Kingdom's analysis of the aviation industry has proven to
be valid and constant to this day, and particularly so in the United States'
experience after the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978. Strict control of
"fifth freedom" rights in tightly crafted nearly exclusively bilateral agree-
ments remained until 2002 when the European Court of Justice ruled that
nationality clauses in many of the bilateral agreements violated EU non-
discrimination laws.96 This ruling was the opening that triggered produc-
tive negotiations on phase one of the U.S.-EU Open Skies treaty, which
takes effect at the end of March of 2008. Moving away from prior protec-
tionism, a stated goal of the Agreement is to minimize government inter-
ference and regulation. 97
III. DOMINANCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL TREATY: LEGAL
AND COMPETITIVE IMPLICATIONS
The benefits or sacrifices of U.S. aviation labor have been greatly influ-
enced by the protections of the U.S. labor, bankruptcy, and anti-trust
laws. Therefore, how international laws may supersede existing U.S. laws
is crucial to U.S. labor's bargaining leverage for pay, benefits, work rules,
and participation in company decision making. Preeminence of interna-
tional agreements may become more significant as the United States and
92. Chicago Convention, supra note 5.
93. CHENG, supra note 5, at 21.
94. Id. at 21.
95. Id. at 20.
96. U.S. Government Accountability Office, Transatlantic Aviation: Effects of Easing
Restrictions on U.S.-European Markets, GAO-04-835, 3 (July 2004), available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04835.pdf (cases reviewed include: Cases C-466/98,
Comm'n v. United Kingdom, 2002 E.C.R. 1-09427; Case C-467/98, Comm'n v.
Denmark, 2002 E.C.R. 1-09514; Case C-468/98, Comm'n v. Sweden, 2002 E.C.R. 1-
09575; C-469/98, Comm'n v. Finland, 2002 E.C.R. 1-09627; C-472/98, Comm'n v.
Luxembourg, 2002 E.C.R. 109741; C-475/98, Comm'n v. Austria, 2002 E.C.R. I-
09797; C-476/98, Comm'n v. Germany, 2002 E.C.R. 1-09855; available at http:I/eu-
law.typepad.com/eulawblog/2007/05/the-air-transpo.html).
97. U.S.-EU Air Transport Agreement, supra note 12.
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European Union move from executing Phase I into Phase II of the Air
Transport Agreement, and on to broader global treaties with other re-
gions of the world in the coming years. This historic Open Skies expan-
sion of multi-national harmonization, which affects 51 percent of all
global flights, is only one significant piece of the International Civil Avia-
tion Organization's plan to "to create an environment in which interna-
tional air transport may develop and flourish in a stable, efficient and
economical manner without compromising safety and security."'98
While this liberalization is noteworthy, bilateral agreements still exist
for both the EU and the United States with nations in Asia and elsewhere
in the world. Actions which might be legal in a purely U.S.-EU context,
such as European multinational mergers, may still be prohibited by
agreements held with other nations or regions. 99 To date, global com-
merce treaties, which include aviation issues, have restricted their provi-
sions to ancillary services, and have not impinged on control of route
rights, frequencies, or fares.
Article seven of the Agreement does address "Application of Laws."' 100
It allows that operations within each member state will follow existing
laws for admission and air navigation of the member state. Article eight
allows provisions for states to request safety reviews of other states and
deny rights to those found below ICAO required standards and unable to
meet those standards in a "reasonable" time. 01 Mutual respect and sup-
port for the security provisions desired by each country are to be honored
as well, and unsatisfactory compliance not remedied in fifteen days is
cause for revocation of operating rights.102
A. TREATY PREEMINENCE
By its terms, the U.S.-EU Air Transport Agreement supersedes all
prior bilateral agreements among signatories. This provision is a depar-
ture from previous agreements such as the U.S. - United Kingdom Ber-
muda II agreement which specified that U.S. anti-trust legislation would
prevail. 10 3 The new Open Skies agreement outlines broad commercial
and financial liberalization and harmonization, but it does retain some
specifications where the requirements of the treaty are not to supersede,
European Union, United States, or member state laws. Article thirteen,
Pricing, is one example where U.S. fares for routes within the E.U. must
be consistent with Article one, section three of Council Regulation
98. Taieb Cherif, Sec'y Gen. of the Int'l Civil Aviation Org., Keynote Address to the
China Civil Aviation Dev. Forum: ICAO - Leading Aviation through Challenging
Times, 4 (May 9, 2007) available at http://www.icao.int/icao/en/osg/osg_2007-China
_en.pdf.
99. Transatlantic Aviation, supra note 98, at 31.
100. Id. Art. 7.
101. Id. Art. 8.
102. Id. Art. 9.
103. AN INTRODUCTION TO AIR LAW, supra note 90, at 63.
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(EEC) 2409/92 of 23 July 1992.104 As we move forward to the agree-
ment's second stage (Phase II) over the coming years it is noteworthy
that any terms agreed to and ratified by the U.S. Senate will be binding
upon all U.S. licensed corporations.
By the Constitution, a treaty is placed on the same footing, and made
of like obligation, with an act of legislation. Both are declared by that
instrument to be the supreme law of the land, and no superior efficacy is
given to either over the other. When the two relate to the same subject,
the courts will always endeavor to construe them so as to give effect to
both, if that can be done without violating the language of either; but if
the two are inconsistent, the one last in date will control the other, pro-
vided always the stipulation of the treaty on the subject is self-executing.
If the country with which the treaty is made is dissatisfied with the action
of the legislative department, it may present its complaint to the execu-
tive head of the government, and take such other measures as it may
deem essential for the protection of its interests. The courts can afford no
redress.10 5
Heightening the significance of the treaties prevalence over domestic
law are this treaties dispute resolution provisions regarding interpretation
or application of the treaty. Articles eighteen and nineteen establish
binding decisions by the Joint Committee of the member states or appeal
to a three member board of arbitration.10 6 These ruling powers are more
controlling in many ways than those under the U.S. Railway Labor Act
discussed in section I.B above. Thus the potential impact on U.S. labor of
the Second Stage of the U.S.-EU Air Transport Agreement is enormous.
B. RELATED PLURILATERAL INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS:
THE WTO AND GATS
While the World Trade Organization' 0 7 in its Annex 4(a) Agreement
on Trade in Civil Aircraft, 108 and its Annex 1B from the Uruguay Round
of General Agreement on Trade and Services (GATS) 10 9 include aircraft
parts and related equipment, as well as maintenance and computer reser-
vation services, they only address ancillary rights not directly related to
the control of air routes or labor rights. 110 The GATS Annex on Air
Transport Services specifically excludes "traffic rights, however granted;
104. U.S.-EU Air Transport Agreement, supra note 12, Art. 13.
105. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Franklin Mint Corp., 466 U.S. 243, 252 (1984);
Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888); see also United States v. Palestine
Liberation Organization, 695 F. Supp. 1456, 1464 (D.N.Y. 1988).
106. U.S.-EU Air Transport Agreement, supra note 12, Art. 9.
107. Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, http://www.wto.org/
english/docs-e/legal-e/04-wto.pdf (last visited Sept. 5, 2008).
108. Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations, Annex 4(a) Agreement on Trade in Civil Aircraft, Apr. 15, 1994, 33
I.L.M. 1125 (1994), available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs-e/legal-e/air-79_e.
pdf [hereinafter Final Act].
109. Id. at 1168.
110. AN INTRODuCTION To AIR LAW, supra note 90, at 66.
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or services directly related to the exercise of traffic rights ... 
C. GOALS FOR THE COMING TREATY AFFECTING LABOR ISSUES
Article twenty-one of the Agreement states the timetable and goals for
Phase 11.112 Among them is "provision of aircraft with crew."' 113 At its
most benign, this could simply refer to safety standards for minimum
manning. But with the predicted shortage of licensed pilots,114 it could be
used to support initiatives for a new universal and more rapid licensing
for commercial aircrews.
Under the current ICAO system, pilots authorized to fly in an aircraft's
country of registration are legal to fly into any ICAO contracting nation.
Already, ICAO is promulgating new Standards and Recommended Prac-
tices in its first major alteration to its Annex I on Pilot Licensing since
1944, called the Multi-Crew Pilot License. 11 5 More drastically, the Open
Skies "provisioning of aircraft with crew" could lead to global implemen-
tations of mandatory crew duty hours, and to legalizing aircraft fully
staffed by labor from lowest cost foreign countries outside the company's
state of registry.
Also encouraged for development in Phase II will be increased foreign
ownership rights, and further liberalization of air traffic rights. 116 The
later implies full open cabotage access to all flying within the United
States. Open cabotage almost makes ownership inconsequential. Once a
foreign registered corporation has full rights to establish a route structure
within the U. S. market, there is limited need to take ownership of an
American carrier.
IV. POTENTIAL CHANGES FROM "OPEN SKIES": U.S.
DEREGULATION'S EFFECT ON AIRLINES, CONSUMERS, AND
LABOR AS A FORECAST
What guidance is available to forecast the impact of Open Skies lead-
ing to global access to the U.S. aviation market? While the GAO tried to
answer that question by studying results of increasing numbers of parallel
yet independent bilateral Open Skies agreements with foreign carriers
buttressed with concurrent selective exclusions to anti-trust restric-
tions,1 17 perhaps the results of the U.S. domestic deregulation provide a
more accurate barometer. Deregulation in aviation is an Act of Congress
which lowered prices for the U.S. consumer. A look at the trends of
globalization in other major U.S. industries and skilled labor groups may
111. Final Act, supra note 108, at 1188.
112. U.S.-EU Air Transport Agreement, supra note 12, Art. 21.
113. Id.
114. James Wallace, Boeing unit tries to speed pilot training to fill high demand, SEAT-
TLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Apr. 30, 2007, at Al.
115. Graham J. F. Hunt, System of Regulating Aircrew Licensing in Need of Surveil-
lance-Based Approach, 55 ICAO J. 8, 18 (Oct. 2000).
116. U.S.-EU Air Transport Agreement, supra note 12.
117. Transatlantic Aviation, supra note 96.
720 LAW AND BUSINESS REVIEW OF THE AMERICAS [Vol. 14
also predict the impact of such a drastic market change on the aviation
labor group. This section explores how deregulation has affected U.S.
consumers, its financial impact on the commercial aviation industry and
its workers, and the ability of the government to support and effectively
regulate such wholesale liberalization of market access and control. It
closes with a look at legal coping mechanisms developed by air carriers
and those which may be required to meet further liberalization.
The Government Accountability Office (GAO) reports that the me-
dian price of an airline ticket today (in constant dollars) is down forty
percent since 1980.118 The number of flights within the United States has
nearly quintupled since domestic deregulation began. 119 Total industry
revenue (in constant dollars) has more than doubled since 1978,120 how-
ever, profits for the industry overall have not increased. 12' Pilots at es-
tablished airlines today have only two-thirds the purchasing power they
had in 1978.122 A host of ills raise questions of the Act's benefit. Senator
John McCain, as chairman of the United States Senate Committee on
Commerce, Science, and Transportation, requested the U.S. Government
Accountability Office (GAO) evaluate the impact of broad new regional
Open Skies agreements between the United States and the entire Euro-
pean Union.' 23 The GAO anticipates potential benefits to U.S. consum-
ers, airlines, and labor, but concedes there is the possibility that
European airlines may consolidate, relocate, or create subsidiaries in
lower cost new European Union member countries which would elimi-
nate current jobs, reduce wages overall, and possibly decrease competi-
tion and consumer choice. 124 They base this belief principally on the
changes seen in the past fifteen years with the increasing number of inde-
pendent bilateral U.S. Open Skies agreements with EU nations that carry
small percentages of transatlantic traffic.' 25
The GAO based their answers by looking at results of increasing num-
bers of parallel yet independent bilateral Open Skies agreements with
foreign carriers with concurrent selective exclusions to antitrust restric-
118. See U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-06-630 Airline Deregula-
tion: Reregulating the Airline Industry Would Likely Reverse Consumer Benefits
and Not Save Airline Pensions 18-21 (2006), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.
items/d06630.pdf.
119. U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., An Analysis of Labor and Multifactor Productivity in Air
Transportation: 1990-2001, Fig 1, available at, http://www.bts.gov/programs/
economics and finance/an.analysis-of laborand multifactor-productivity/html/
figure_.01.html.
120. AIRLINE DEREGULATION, supra note 118, at 12.
121. See Id. at 12-14.
122. $100 and Our Contract vs. CPI-Urban (1977-2007), FLIGHTLINE, Fall 2007, at 19,
available at http://www.alliedpilots.org/Public/Publications/Flightline/FLFall2007-
Public.pdf.
123. Transatlantic Aviation, supra note 96, at 18.
124. Id. at 1.
125. See id. at 14-36 (EU MEMBER STATES WITH BILATERAL U.S. OPENSKIES AGREE-
MENTS SINCE 1992 ARE: Netherlands'92, Austria'95, Belgium'95, Czech Repub-
lic'95, Denmark'95, Finland'95, Luxembourg'95, Sweden'95, Germany'96, Italy'98,
Portugal'99, Malta'00, Slovakia'00, France'01, Poland'01).
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tions. Perhaps a more appropriate indicator of the impact of sudden lib-
eralization of the marketplace would be to look at U.S. aviation
deregulation or other globalized major industries and answer some basic
questions such as: Does the consumer have greater choice of product? Is
the product quality improved? Has the price of the product relative to
average income decreased? Does the new product enhance safety and
security for the American consumer? Have the workers in the industry
realized improved benefits or wages? If not, does the loss to those work-
ers significantly harm the economy in general?
Only Southwest Airlines has prospered since the Airline Deregulation
Act was passed, and just one single other major airline has managed to
survive intact. 126 Airlines have reduced and outsourced their mainte-
nance to minimum levels on aging fleets, the air traffic system is over-
loaded, and on-time performance is at an all time low. Customers have
literally been treated like cattle and held captive on unserviced airplanes.
This article will not expand into covering the effects of unbridled com-
petition upon the aviation keystones of safety and security. Another
study could be written on increasing concerns that runway safety and
proper FAA safety oversight from maintenance to incident reporting are
falling below adequate levels. 127 And despite the oppressive presence of
the Homeland and Transportation Security Administrations, lack of abil-
ity to effectively secure U.S. borders is unlikely to be improved by com-
pletely opening U.S. skies to anyone who wants to fly registered aircraft
in and about the continental United States.
A. REMEMBER PAN AM, HAS ANY U.S. CARRIER REALLY
SURVIVED DEREGULATION?
Since Supreme Court Justice Stephen Breyer (then an attorney on the
staff of Senator Kennedy) and Senator Ted Kennedy determined to clean
up the cronyism and corruption at the government's Civil Aeronautics
Board (CAB) in 1974,128 only a single major airline from that year is still
flying in the U.S. today without having entered bankruptcy. 129 As the
follow up to eliminating the junket jewel of government administrative
agencies, the CAB, Senator Kennedy showcased Yale economist Alfred
Kahn to educate Congress and the American people on the purported
need for, and benefits to be gained by, deregulating the airlines. 130
Since the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 was passed, no fewer than
126. George F. Will, An Airline That Isn't Bankrupt, WASH. POST, Jan. 25, 2007, at A25,
available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/01/24/
AR2007012401647.html.
127. Slobodan Lekic, Runway Incursions a Concern at Overcrowded Airports, AP, No-
vember 9, 2007, available at http://www.aviation.com/safety/071108-ap-runway-
incursions.html.
128. See PETERSON & GLAB, supra note 21, at 35-48.
129. Will, supra note 127.
130. See PETERSON & GLAB, supra note 21, at 46-48.
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145 airlines in the U.S. have gone out of business. 131 America's interna-
tional flagship airline Pan American is now a relic of a bygone era. At
least seventy-eight airlines started after 1978 have not survived under
deregulation. 32 Among the more famous on that list was employee
owned Peoples Express; among the more infamous was Frank Lorenzo's
cannibalistic Texas International. Before its collapse Texas International
parent Texas Air Corporation held title to one of every five seats in the
skies over the continental United States. 133
As a presidential candidate, Bill Clinton assessed U.S. deregulation of
the airlines by stating that "we've wrecked the airline industry."'1 34 Rob-
ert Crandall is widely considered to be among the most innovative and
successful leaders of any airline in history. The former American Airlines
Chief Executive Officer offered a more measured analysis of what der-
egulation did to the industry by stating in his famously direct and conclu-
sive manner, "deregulation is profoundly anti-labor ... there has been a
massive transfer of wealth from airline employees to airline
passengers."'13
5
B. PRESCIENT TRADE INDUCED CHANGES IN OTHER U.S. INDUSTRIES
Labor in other U.S. industries which have experienced global liberali-
zation has experienced a similar loss of job security and participation in
corporate profits. The auto industry is a prime example. But highly edu-
cated U.S. labor in areas such as telecommunications engineers and the
legal profession have also seen the very services they created facilitate
ownership's ability to transfer valuable jobs over to foreign-based work
centers. The Air Transport Agreement mentions benefiting labor as a
goal, but it does not provide operational or legal structures to ensure it.
Similar shortcomings in the North American Free Trade Agreement re-
sulted in indirect, but significant costs to U.S. workers and taxpayers.
The experiences in other industries and with other agreements establish
concerning trends of eliminating job opportunities which establish a mid-
dle class work force that forms consumers and taxpayers who sustain the
American economic system.
Henry Ford institutionalized the assembly line and raced to supremacy
in the auto industry with the philosophy that paying workers good wages,
and providing good benefits gained worker loyalty, a superior quality
product, and created a working class that would not only be producers,
but could be consumers as well. 136
Back in 1973 it was the unexpected rise in oil prices by the Organiza-
tion of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) that triggered the tumult
131. List of Defunct United States Airlines, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List-of-de-
functairlines#NorthAmerica.
132. Id.
133. PETZINGER, supra note 21.
134. PETERSON & GLAB, supra note 21, at 11.
135. Id. at 127.
136. DAVID G. EPSTEIN ET AL., BUSINESS STRUCTUREs 487 (2007).
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in the U.S. auto industry.1 37 In that year, the sixteen U.S. automakers
produced over ten million vehicles. 138 By 1982, U.S. auto production had
dropped to just over six million, and Chrysler, propped up by federal
loans, was struggling to survive. 139 That year, while the auto industry
pressured Congress to pass laws restricting United States import of for-
eign made cars, Honda built the first Japanese owned manufacturing
plant inside the United States.140 By 1990 the U.S. population had in-
creased 20 percent over 1973,'141 but U.S. production of autos dropped
more than 40 percent for the same period. 142
Much as Pittsburgh once was a mighty steel town, today Detroit is
crumbling with the fall of the auto industry. The Detroit auto manufac-
turing area reports the highest unemployment in the nation. 1 43 Corre-
spondingly, defaults on home mortgages for the motor city are at the
highest rate in the nation, nearly five times the national average. 144 Per-
sonal bankruptcy in Michigan is at an all time high. 145
The unionized American autoworker has been displaced by direct com-
petition of foreign carmakers producing abroad and at the foreign non-
unionized plants outside Michigan. In the twenty years from 1978 to
1998, the number of United Automobile Workers of America members
fell by over 67 percent.' 46 The 2007 contracts for the UAW cut even
deeper; U.S. automakers claimed they had to slash previously guaranteed
medical retirement benefits to remain viable competitors in the mar-
ket. 147 U.S. automakers intend to cut union jobs even further in the com-
137. Michael Cornstubble, Japanese U.S. Auto Transplant Production: An Analysis of
the Roles of VERs and the Exchange Rate, U. AVENUE UNDERGRADUATE J. ECON.
v. II, n.1 at 4 (1998), available at http://www.econ.ilstu.edu/uauje/PDF%27s/issue
1998/TransplantProduction.pdf.
138. See U.S. Automobile Production Figures, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/U.S.-Auto-
mobileProductionFigures (last visited Sept. 5, 2008).
139. U.S. Automobile Production Figures for 1982, http://www.spiritus-temporis.com/
u.s.-automobile-production-figures/production-figures-for-1982.html (last visited
Sept. 5, 2008).
140. Press Release, Honda, Honda's First U.S. Auto Plant Celebrates 25 Years of Pro-
duction (Nov. 1, 2007), available at http://world.honda.com/news/2007/c071101US-
Auto-Plant-Celebrates-25Years.
141. U.S. Census Figures for 1973, http://www.infoplease.com/year/1973.html#us (last
visited Sept. 5, 2008).
142. U.S. Automobile Production Figures for 1990, http://www.spiritus-temporis.com/
u.s.-automobile-production-figures/production-figures-for-1990.html (last visited
Sept. 5, 2008).
143. National Labor Bureau, Metropolitan Area Employment and Unemployment Sum-
mary 2 (January 29, 2008), available at http://www.bls.gov/news.release/metro.nrO.
htm.
144. Detroit Area Led Nation in Foreclosures in 2007, Associated Press, Feb. 13 2008,
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/23137436/.
145. Louis Aguilar, More UAW Workers Bankrupt, THE DETROIT NEWS, Sept. 18, 2005,
http://www.detnews.com/2005/autosinsider/0509/18/AO1-318432.htm.
146. David Shepardson, UAW loses 11% of its members, THE DETROIT NEWS, Apr., 13,
2006, http://www.detnews.com/apps/pbcs.dlllarticle?AID=/20060413/AUTO01/604
130375.
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ing years.148
Similarly at the U.S. airlines, management continues to push for further
cuts in labor cost so they can remain viable competitors in their market.
The Airline Industry Consortium has funded what they term "The Airline
Data Project" at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology to indoctri-
nate the academic community, financial community, and news media on
the factors the consortium wants "considered as the industry confronts
consolidation, new competition and renegotiated labor contracts. 149
Their stated goals include "finding a new model for compensation that is
durable and works to address the cyclicality of the industry."1 50 This indi-
cates a definite intent not to fly into the next decade following the status
quo.
In the telecom industry, when the economic impact of the 9/11 terrorist
attacks hit Wall Street, the market capitalization for telecom carriers had
dropped by 2.9 trillion dollars. 151 To survive, the industry went into ex-
tensive cost cutting that included massive layoffs and efforts to replace
essential design and production at substantially lower costs. U.S. compa-
nies reduced costs by relying upon lower wage engineers imported from
overseas, and by moving production and design to lower cost centers
abroad, particularly in India. 152 American engineers who created the
ability to store, process, and transfer information across the globe in an
instant, created the opportunity for U.S. companies to access and utilize
similar skills and production from any location in the world.
Where some industries have found educated workers and stable, indus-
try favorable governments outside the United States, other industries
have followed. Even in the legal profession today, increasing numbers of
firms are contracting legal research to India. As of 2006, over sixty firms
outside the United States provide contract work to companies and legal
firms inside the United States153 At least eleven law firms with interna-
tional presence, firms like Baker McKenzie and Clifford Chance, now
also outsource a significant portion of their legal support work such as
document review, processing, accounting, and information technology
and basic administrative support.1 54
This Agreement, like others before it, delineates rights and limits on
owners, but does not delineate protections for U.S. labor. Broad agree-
ments such as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in-
evitable sire unanticipated problems. Immigration control and boarder
148. Shepardson, supra note 146.
149. See The MIT Airline Data Project, http://web.mit.edu/airlinedata/www/AboutUs.
html (last visited Sept. 5, 2008).
150. Id.
151. Paul D. Baker, Will the Telecom Bust Turn into a Convergent Boom?, CONVER-
GENCE PLUS, Dec. 6, 2002, http://www.convergenceplus.com/dec02%20telecom%
20outlook %2004.html.
152. Sharon Begley, 'Shortage' of Engineers: Employers More Choosy, CAREER JOUR-
NAL (November 21, 2005), http://www.marketingpower.com/content3l7l8.php.
153. London & Friedmann, supra note 25.
154. Id.
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security are key issues in U.S. politics now. While NAFTA liberalized the
trade of goods and services, it did not standardize, unify, or harmonize a
common legal structure for the free movement of labor. 155
Nor did NAFTA provide for a unification of currency or capital and
accounting systems as has the European Union. The collapse of the Mex-
ican peso in 1994 and the falling international value of the U.S. dollar
have also added complications for businesses trying to predict the future
business market and plan investments. But the treaty does allow a legal
remedy for foreign investors "unfairly harmed" by NAFI'A regulations
via extra-judicial special NAFTA tribunals which may award U.S. govern-
ment funds in compensation. 156 Labor or consumers are not afforded
similar access to the tribunals. 157 By 2004, $13 billion in claims had been
made against the U.S. government. 158 To gain political backing, business
risk was legally passed to U.S. taxpayers. This is but another example of
how treaty provisions can be crafted to persuade opposition to allow their
passage, sometimes in ways which harm the American laborer.
Clearly the trend in high skilled professions is to follow the lead of
lower skilled industries and take advantage of the lower costs available
through contracting, partnering with, and possessing support operations
in foreign countries. There is little reason to think that cash strapped
U.S. airlines or established EU carriers would not take advantage of such
opportunities. The U.S. Government Accountability Office report to
Senator McCain acknowledged that possibility. The report also ex-
plained how the United States and European Union have already ap-
proached such leveraging during the decades of their separate
deregulations and increasing, but independent, bilaterally limited Open
Skies agreements to date.
C. PRICES ARE LOWER, MORE PASSENGERS ARE FLYING; ARE THEY
BETTER SERVED?
So who is paying and who is gaining from U.S. deregulation? Some
data would indicate the consumer has fared well, yet recently Congress is
investigating FAA oversight, air traffic management, and creating a bill of
rights for fair treatment of the traveling public on commercial airlines. 159






159. See H.R.1303, 110th Cong. (2007), available at http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill
text.xpd?bill=H110-1303; White House Fact Sheet: Taking Administrative Action
to Address Air Traffic Delays, Nov. 15, 2007, available at http://www.whitehouse.
gov/news/releases/2007/11/20071115-3.html; Gregg Carlstrom, FAA's Lax Over-
sight Extends Overseas, Federal Times.com, Apr. 20, 2008, http://www.federal
times.com/index.php?S=3486876; Kathleen Schalch, Lawmakers Outraged by FAA
Safety Violations, NPRs: All Things Considered, Apr. 3, 2008 http://www.npr.org/
templates/story/story.php?storyld=89355766.
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The average airfare (adjusted for inflation) did drop by roughly a third
from 1977 to 1992.160 Airline labor productivity from 1990 to 1997 rose
over 25 percent. 161 Some estimate that U.S. deregulation passengers re-
alized savings of one hundred billion dollars in its first fifteen years.' 62
The number of people with service all across the nation has vastly ex-
panded by the airlines hub and spoke system. The number of passengers
carried by U.S. scheduled airlines was nearly five times greater in 2007
than in 1977.163
But complaints of lost baggage and poor service are up as flight delays
are at an all time high. 164 And those delays are only recorded as being in
excess of scheduled times. The airlines already add time for expected
ATC delays into their posted schedules. Nor do mere delay numbers
convey the problems caused when passengers on connecting flights arrive
too late to make it on to their connecting flight. Without even consider-
ing the hassles and delays generated by the Transportation Security Ad-
ministration inspections, the pre-deregulation excitement and glamour of
jet travel has become a dreaded necessary evil for most of the traveling
public.
D. UNREGULATED EXPANSION HAS EXCEEDED
INFRASTRUCTURE CAPACITY
Unfortunately, the U.S. air traffic system capacity and the airport sur-
face area in major cities have not expanded while in the words of premier
airline analyst Michael Boyd:
Virtually every necessary upgrade to the ATC system is behind
schedule, over cost estimates, and mismanaged. Worse, the FAA is
not above simply "re-benchmarking" an overdue program, setting a
new date for completion, and telling the world the project is "on
time." That type of management is precisely the reason many of to-
day's airline flights aren't on time.165
The current benchmark for a technology upgrade to our basic radar
control system that was due in 2001 is 2012 with a 50 million dollar cost
160. Asif Saddiqi, Deregulation and Its Consequences, U.S. Centennial of Flight Com-
mission (2003), http://www.centennialofflight.gov/essay/CommercialAviation/
Dereg/Tran8.htm (last visited Sept. 5, 2008).
161. Anthony D. Apostolides, An Analysis of Labor and Multifactor Productivity in Air
Transportation: 1990-2001, U.S. Department of Transportation Bureau of Trans-
portation Statistics, http://www.bts.gov/programs/economics-andfinance/an-anal-
ysis oflabor-andmultifactor-productivity/html/entire.html (last visited Sept. 5,
2008).
162. Asif Saddiqi, supra note 160.
163. U.S. Air Carrier Traffic Statistics, U.S. Department of Transportation Bureau of
Transportation Statistics, http://www.bts.gov/programs/airline information/air_
carriertrafficstatistics/ (last visited Sept. 3, 2008).
164. On-time performance at an all-time low, Associated Press, Aug. 6, 2007, http://
www.msnbc.msn.com/id/20147071/.
165. Michael Boyd, The FAA's Mis-Management of ATC: A Threat To The National
Economy, A Threat To Safety, (2007) http://www.aviationplanning.com/ATC
Faliures.htm.
2008 US-EU OPEN SKIES AGREEMENT
overrun. t 66 With airports and controllers pushing the system too its limits
nearly all day long, it increases the chances for an error that can lead to
more than one aircraft being on a runway at the same time. Such inci-
dents are rising to record levels and are on the National Transportation
Safety Board's (NTSB) "Most Wanted" list.1 67
Beyond the hardware, the human side of the air traffic system is at a
breaking point as well. The air traffic control staffing has never fully re-
covered from the presidential firings of nearly 10,000 air traffic control-
lers during the Professional Air Traffic Controllers (PATCO) strike of
1981.168 Now the bow wave of replacements is retiring at the rate of
three per day, and two-thirds of the current staff are expected to be gone
within eight years.' 69 Yet the FAA is just now beginning to fund major
hiring efforts. The Government Accountability Office reports that the
current shortage of controllers has resulted in controllers working maxi-
mum allowed hours up to six days a week. 170
The controllers vector aircraft flown by pilots who have lost their re-
tirement funds in bankruptcies and taken large pay cuts since 9/11. Many
of the pilots are also pushing themselves to the legal limits to keep up
with their mortgage payments, the rising costs of energy, and college edu-
cations. The Vice-Chairman of the NTSB warns, "Operating or control-
ling an aircraft without adequate rest for the flight crew or controller
presents an unnecessary risk to the traveling public."' 17 1 Pushing the sys-
tem and its people to the limit in an endeavor where safeguards are so
vital is not a wise business practice, nor one that governmental regulation
should incentivize. With the current resources and manpower intermit-
tently maxed out, it appears there is no realistic hope for expansion of
actual service capacity within the current major U.S. airport networks.
The supply of qualified pilots to safely man a vastly expanded system is
in question as well. 172 This may be the remaining strong card the pilots
hold to resist further demands that they do work more hours for less pay
and benefits. But it also increases the incentives for owners to alter the
legal structure to enable them to generate large numbers of available cer-
tified labor from non-traditional sources.
Even today, copilot pay at commuter airlines is less than $20,000 per
year starting and tops out around $34,000.173 The number of military
166. Id.
167. Frances Fiorino, Risks on the Runway, AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH., Feb. 18,
2008 at 62.
168. Brittany R. Ballenstedt, Concerns Mount Over Air Traffic Controller Staffing
Levels, GOVERNMENTEXECUTIVE.COM, Feb. 8, 2007, http://www.govexec.com/
dailyfed/0207/020807bl.htm.
169. Id.
170. Fiorino, supra note 167, at 63.
171. Id.
172. James Wallace, In the Pilot's Seat, in Half the Time, SEATTLE POST-INTELLI-
GENCER, Apr. 30, 2007, at Al.
173. See American Eagle Pilot Pay, http://www.aviationinterviews.com/pay-rates/ameri-
caneagle.html.
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trained pilots available has dropped, and with barely cost of living wages,
U.S. commuter operators are having trouble finding applicants for availa-
ble jobs.174 Instead of raising pay and benefits to draw employees, com-
panies are significantly lowering the experience requirements for the job.
American Eagle has dropped requirements for new pilots down to only
one hundred hours flight experience in a multiengine aircraft. 75 Just as
the U.S. high tech industry sought to deal with the financial pressures of
overexpansion and huge market devaluation in the face of pressing needs
for rapid growth to establish a survivable critical mass in the market
place, the International Civil Aviation Organization has been involved in
generating a new source of pilots.
While ICAO does not license pilots, their standards require that all
member states recognize the licensing of any other state so long as mini-
mums listed in Annex 1, Personnel Licensing, and the license is issued for
flying an aircraft registered in the state that has issued the license. 176 But
ICAO has supported the creation of a new pilot training and license pro-
gram to issue a new multi-crew pilot license (MPL). Major
U.S. airlines still hire only pilots with several thousand hours of experi-
ence flying in actual aircraft to fly passengers on their large commercial
jets. 177 The MPL will certify a high school graduate, who has never flown
before, to become a co-pilot on an airliner that requires more than one
pilot in less than one year of primarily simulator based training.178 This
reduction in "spin up time," coupled with the recent extension of
mandatory pilot retirement age by ICAO and the FAA,179 should provide
short-term relief to fill the gap.
But while the U. S. Federal Aviation Administration must allow for-
eign pilots with MPL licenses to fly airliners registered in their licensing
country to fly into U.S. airports, the FAA does not issue multi-crew pilot
licenses, and no U.S. registered aircraft will fly with such pilots. Thus,
like offshore design and production for U.S. high tech companies, U.S.
airlines may find that off-shore labor costs and work rules a more profita-
ble choice to expand operations even within the United States. Open
Skies may provide incentive to expand via foreign owned subsidiary oper-
ations flying into and through fully deregulated U.S. airspace in the com-
ing years.
174. Scott McCartney, The Middle Seat: Airlines Lower Bar to Fill Pilot Ranks, WALL
ST. J., Dec. 18, 2007, at D1.
175. See Airline Transport Professionals, American Eagle, http://www.pilotjobs.com/de-
fault.lasso?page=airline&airline=37 (last visited Sept. 5, 2008).
176. ICAO, International Civil Aviation Organization Air Navigation Bureau Frequently
Asked Questions, http://www.icao.int/cgi/goto-m-anb.pl?icao/en/trivia/peltrgFAQ.
htm (last visited Sept. 5, 2008).
177. Scott McCartney, supra note 174.
178. New Pilot Training Plan Sparks Worries, Associated Press, Aug. 23, 2005, http://
asia.news.yahoo.com/070822/ap/d8r687io0.html.
179. Scott McCartney, supra note 174.
2008 US-EU OPEN SKIES AGREEMENT
E. DEREGULATION EXPANSION VIA ANTI-TRUST EXEMPTION
As evidenced by the numerous bankruptcies that have occurred since
deregulation, the airlines are unforgivingly ravenous for capital. When
the scheduled departure time arrives, the inventory of unsold seats be-
comes lost product. As the United Kingdom predicted at the Chicago
Convention in 1944, deregulation of capacity and access tends to result in
near suicidal contests to establish a dominant market position and sell
every seat via lowered prices.' 8 0 In the United States, the Department of
Transportation (DOT) holds the power to exempt airlines from anti-trust
law provisions. 181 This power is exercised under the advisement of the
U.S. Department of Justice, pursuant to the Sherman Antitrust Act and
the Clayton Act.' 82 In 1987, the DOT allowed domestic carriers to col-
laborate in scheduling flights at major airports. 183 The agency's apparent
purpose was to resolve ever-mounting numbers of delays, as the under-
staffed air traffic control system was overwhelmed by the unconstrained,
simultaneous scheduling of the ideal takeoff times by numerous
airlines. 184
Traditionally, when restricted international routes became available,
the airlines purchased them, along with the additional aircrafts to service
the new routes. 85 Airlines provide a "perishable" product through a
complex symphony of labor-intensive services with huge fixed costs.
With fares dropping dramatically, however, the airlines had less capital to
finance such expansions. In 1987, United Airlines went from having no
flights across the North Atlantic, to becoming a major player into that
"global gem" of aviation-London's Heathrow airport.18 6 The airline ac-
complished this expansion, at minimal cost, by simply "code-sharing"
with British Airways. 87 In the process, DOT let the saving grace of anti-
trust immunity go global. Government intervention relaxing anti-trust
immunities has allowed some airlines to compete and expand internation-
ally with minimum expenditure via code-sharing agreements, while pro-
viding no benefits to their domestic labor.188
The economic shock of the first Gulf War in 1991 wrenched the eco-
nomic crunch on the industry even tighter. The U.S. airlines lost more
money in the two years following the Gulf War than the sum total of all
profits for the industry in the previous sixty years. 89 As had a host of air
carriers in the domestic market, Laker Air showed that even across the
180. CHENG, supra note 5, at 18-27.
181. See PETERSON & GLAB, supra note 21, at 216.
182. Transatlantic Aviation, supra note 96, at 18 n.21.
183. See PETERSON & GLAB, supra note 21, at 216.
184. See id.
185. See PETZINGER, supra note 21, at 333-35. The purchase of Eastern Airlines' South
American routes by American Airlines in 1989 is an example of how attractive the
restricted international routes can be when they become available.
186. PETZINGER, supra note 21, at 354.
187. Id. at 354.
188. See Transatlantic Aviation, supra note 96, at 16.
189. PETERSON & GLAB, supra note 21, at 298.
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North Atlantic, cut-rate pricing could not sustain the capital requirements
in an industry so affected by broader economic downturns.1 90 Traditional
growth methods were no longer effective in a growing international cli-
mate of cutthroat competition for market presence.
Beginning in 1993, when the DOT felt that some U.S. airlines simply
did not have the capital to generate an international system of the size
required for competitive sustainability, the government expanded exemp-
tions to the restrictions imposed by anti-trust law. 191 Such immunity,
aimed in part at effectively integrating networks and service with other
international carriers, has only been allowed for alliances with foreign
carriers registered in nations that have signed bilateral open skies agree-
ments with the United States.192 This became the functional method for
linking domestic deregulation into the expanding global networks until
the new comprehensive U.S.-EU Open Skies Agreement.1 93
As predicted by the United Kingdom in 1944, unregulated access to
market entry aviation has lead to a fiscally suicidal competition for domi-
nant presence. Deregulation has provided survivable conditions for only
the most efficient, or temporarily advantaged, carriers while all others fly
on the edge of stalling out of existence when external constrictions afflict
the market. As a result, there is constant pressure to reduce all costs by
providing the least acceptable service, labor is constantly treated as a bur-
den rather than the core of production, and the air traffic system is over-
loaded to its physical limits. Deregulation was intended to enhance
consumer choice through increased competition, but air service in the
United States is about to collapse into only four major airlines. Govern-
ment agency application of anti-trust immunity and bankruptcy law has
been a dominant factor enabling the very existence of airlines through
"deregulation."
VI. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS: WHERE WE ARE
HEADED: POTENTIAL OUTCOMES FOR AMERICAN LABOR
OF INTERNATIONAL LIBERALIZATION OF AVIATION
In remarks heralding the new U.S.-EU Open Skies Air Transport
Agreement to the International Aviation Club, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SEC-
RETARY FOR TRANSPORTATION AFFAIRS JOHN R. BYERLY stated that al-
though this new Agreement, and the vast changes in global aviation of
the past twenty years, and even the past twenty months, may seem ex-
traordinary, "we haven't seen anything yet."' 94
190. See PETZINGER, supra note 21, at 188-89.
191. See Transatlantic Aviation, supra note 96, at 18.
192. Id.
193. See U.S. Dep't of State Fact Sheet, supra note 4.
194. John R. Byerly, Deputy Asst. Sec'y for Transp. Affairs, U.S. Dep't of State, U.S.-
E.U. Aviation Relations: Success Today and Potential for the Future, Remarks at
the International Aviation Club (Apr. 24, 2007), available at http://www.state.gov/
e/eeb/rls/rm/2007/84121.htm (last visited July 31, 2008).
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For U.S. labor this likely means little relief from (or even an accelera-
tion of) the trends from domestic deregulation. Broadening deregulation
of U.S. skies to a global scale may incite a fiscally precipitous race to
expand, and overload a system already overtaxing its capacity. As the
total number of jobs keeps increasing, working conditions and pay for
those jobs continues to fall. Industry profits will remain flat under the
pressure from new entrants who continue to drive prices down to suicidal
levels. Under these pressures, more carriers will go bankrupt or cease
operations.
It could get even worse for U.S. labor; the Air Transport Agreement
Phase II allowances could institute a new globally harmonized legal struc-
ture which, as has occurred in other U.S. industries, undercuts the legal
support which provided labor leverage to sustain profitable careers under
favorable work rules. The original Chicago Convention was not crafted
from altruistic or purely business considerations, but was the product of
vigorous political-power maneuvering including personal confrontations
between Winston Churchill and Franklin Roosevelt. 95 With fully open
skies and legal authorization, airlines could potentially reincorporate and
staff from more economically favorable nations.
A. NAVIGATING SUPRATERRITORIAL TRANSFORMATION
Phase II of Open Skies is but a first step as the world moves towards
global harmonization of the aviation industry. The industry is ripe for
revolutionary change. Information technology may have surpassed avia-
tion as the medium compressing distance to create a meeting place for
social and business interactions, and enhancing the interconnectedness
and interdependence between nations. For aviation to keep pace with
other rapidly advancing tools of international commerce, it will require
investing in a single global integrated air travel system that is as seamless
and unified as possible. If our government allows regulation or statute to
unduly restrict that progress, the United States will lose business opportu-
nities in the global marketplace. The need to move forward rapidly cre-
ates a temptation to pursue methods gaining that advance with
insufficient minimum capital outlay. There is potential for massive out-
source and offshore ownership of what has been an industry of American
strength and leadership since the Wright Brothers first flight at Kitty
Hawk.
We should evaluate such choices with a broad consideration of what
constitutes progress. The aviation industry remains a field where the
tools of technology and regulation must achieve a workable balance. It is
an industry central to national security and the daily safety of great num-
195. See generally Alan P. Dobson, The Other Air Battle: The American Pursuit of Post-
War Civil Aviation Rights, 28 HIST. J. 429-39 (1985), available at JSTOR, http://
www.jstor.org/pss/2639109 (providing a history of negotiations at the 1944 Chicago
civil aviation conference, as well as the associated dialogue between Churchill and
Roosevelt during that period).
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bers of our citizens. We should look to advance global aviation in a man-
ner which does not shortsightedly undermine the oversight and training
required to guarantee this nation reliable, secure, and safe air transport
service.
The aviation industry is important to American economic and strategic
strength and prosperity. This necessitates measured resistance to regula-
tory arbitrage and social losses even as we pursue enticing economic lib-
eralization. It seems possible that cost-conscious haste may result in
business choices which exterminate another segment of domestic skilled
labor. It seems imprudent that, while our government still fully controls
policy and activity within our national borders, it should allow this race to
benefit from global compression and interconnectedness at the lowest
cost-a race that continues to consume the standard of living of the very
workers who created the foundation for that progress.
B. MUCH MORE OF THE SAME: THE NEAR TERM OF EXPANSION
WITHOUT EXPULSION
Just as U.S. carriers have seen new entrants, even those with much
lower cost structures, come and go out of business, it is possible that the
potential flood of new European carriers over U.S. skies will do nothing
more than prolong the expansion in number of cities served and of flight
frequencies being offered at prices under ever downward pressure. These
dynamics keep the whole industry at minimal profits while labor watches
its pay and benefits slowly dwindle. It is not surprising if labor unions
sense that now may be the time for them to make their "last" stand to
prevent losing their share of whatever prosperity the industry may
achieve. Accordingly, the coming rounds of aviation labor negotiations
may well require actions by the President or Congress to reach
settlements.
Companies and countries preparations for this month's start of Open
Skies indicate they will move to expand and cut labor pay and benefits.
Both European and U.S. airlines are moving toward newly allowed con-
solidations, international airports are being created or expanded, and en-
tirely new international carriers are being launched. Businesses and
nations are positioning themselves to be the ones in the industry who
possess the "abundant factors which will benefit" as international avia-
tion liberalizes. 196
U.S. carriers such as Delta and Northwest or United and Continental
are in serious discussions to consolidate. Like the Japanese did in the
auto manufacturing industry, Britain's Virgin Air is trying to establish it-
196. RALPH H. FOLSOM ET. AL., INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS 392 (9th
ed., Thomson West 2006); see also P.J. LLOYD, CTR. FOR RESEARCH IN ECON.
DEV. & INT'L TRADE (CREDIT), UNIVERSITY OF NOTTINGHAM, RESEARCH PA-
PER No. 98/6, A GENERALISATION OF THE STOLPER-SAMUELSON THEOREM WITH
DIVERSIFIED HOUSEHOLDS: A TALE OF Two MATRICES 2 (1998), available at
http://www.nottingham.ac.ukleconomics/credit/research/papers/cp.98.6.pdf.
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self using resources within the United States by establishing a presence
with new U.S. based Virgin America. London's Heathrow airport has
opened new slots, a new terminal, and is currently seeking approval to
start on a new runway as well. At the same time, British Airways (BA)
will challenge Ryanair's new trans-Atlantic discount service with its dis-
count subsidiary-Open Skies. Furthermore, the merged Dutch KLM and
Air France have acquired a stake in Alitalia, while Lufthansa-SAS has
begun cross-oceanic acquisitions by buying a stake in the U.S. airline,
JetBlue.
Indications are that organized labor will make a stand to avoid being
cast aside in these coming expansions. They take the experiences with
globalization of other formerly dominate U.S. industries, and the results
of regional and world-wide trade liberalization, as examples that do not
bode well for highly paid labor. In 2008, British Airways pilots voted
overwhelmingly to conduct industrial actions if British Airway staffs their
new OpenSkies airline with non-BA pilots. 197 Realizing such actions
would face protracted appeals in litigation, they have decided to seek
EU-wide support for a change in applicable laws so that Article 43 of the
Treaty of Rome' 98 might not be interpreted to prohibit such a job
action. 199
Wisely recognizing that national legal authority is still essential if they
are to prevail, "[t]he British Airlines Pilots' Association has successfully
applied for a speedy High Court trial on the legitimacy of the proposed
strike action by pilots in British Airways who are opposing the airline's
plan to outsource their jobs. '200 The pilots at American Airlines have
already asked for the U.S. National Mediation Board to declare an im-
passe in their negotiations to recover the concessions they surrendered to
avoid bankruptcy in 2003.201 Similarly, the pilots at Delta and Northwest
Airlines have taken an active pre-merger role in negotiating labor agree-
ments to an extent that could control whether those companies conclude
197. Nick Clark, Pilots' Union Backs Away from Battle with British Airways Over
OpenSkies Airline, THE INDEP., May 23, 2008, available at http://www.independent.
co.uk/news/business/news/pilots-union-backs-away-from-battle-with-british-air-
ways-over-openskies-airline-832931.html.
198. See Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European Community
Art. 43, Dec. 29, 2006, 2006 O.J. (C 321) 37, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/
LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2006:321E:0001:0331:EN:pdf. What was
once known as the Treaty of Rome is now known as The Treaty Establishing the
European Community. The Treaty Establishing the European Community will
once again be renamed when the Lisbon Treaty enters into force, renaming it the
Treaty on the Functioning of the Union (TFU). See Youri Devuyst, The European
Union's Institutional Balance After the Treaty of Lisbon: "Community Method"
and "Democratic Deficit" Reassessed, 39 GEO. J. INT'L L. 247, 261 (2008).
199. Clark, supra note 197.
200. Press Release, British Airline Pilots Ass'n, Court Grants Pilots Trial Request (Mar.
19, 2008), available at http://www.baplane-bapilot.org/News/Court-Grants-Pilots-
Request.aspx.
201. David Koenig, American Pilots Ask for Mediation in Contract Talks, USA TODAY,
Jan. 11, 2008, available at http://www.usatoday.com/travel/flights/2008-01-11-aa-pi-
lot-mediationN.htm.
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a deal.202 The current tight supply of licensed pilots, and the increasing
competitive need for airlines to provide frequency on key routes, may
allow labor groups to successfully flex their leverage for the near term.
But with today's tenuous economy and the strangling pressures of ever
rising fuel costs, it is likely that the President or Congress - as the Presi-
dent demonstrated in issuing Executive Order 13205 to prohibit strikes in
aviation in the Spring of 2001203 - will have little tolerance for action by
any group that puts additional strain on U.S. interstate or international
commerce. It is most likely that for the coming year or two this industry
will continue to see established carriers seek to battle an onslaught of
new carriers by lowering costs in every conceivable area while expanding
in every legal and fiscally conceivable manner. The government will not
allow labor to recoup any decreased pay or benefits at the expense of
consumers, and the air transport system performance will continue to de-
teriorate as the government attempts to allow market expansion in an air
traffic control system which operates beyond its current staffing and
physical capabilities.
C. A WHOLE NEW WORLD: AVIATION TRULY GOES GLOBAL, AND
JOBs Go WITH IT
There are already indications that the Air Transport Agreement could
usher in an entirely new business model for providing air travel. Avia-
tion's gateway to the world, London's Heathrow airport, is expanding
physically and competitively as the United Kingdom unlocks its crown
jewel to new carriers and new destinations. For the first time in history
new scheduled low-cost carriers are attempting to provide point-to-point
scheduled service across the North Atlantic. 20 4 In opening the U.S. mar-
ket to the EU aviation industry, we invite in a community that has enthu-
siastically employed the successful strategies of Southwest Airlines in the
United States. Since 1994, the number of Southwest-style operators in
the EU has gone from zero to sixty.20 5 With the service of EasyJet and
RyanAir, the British now own more second homes in foreign countries,
per capita, than any other nation. 20 6 The opportunities to expand global
service via alliances without any acquisition of new equipment or staff are
about to expand significantly.
But even the liberalizations of the Second Stage of the U.S.-EU Air
Transport Agreement in 2010, "Open Skies, Phase II," are only a first
202. Pilots Keep Delta-NWA Merger Talks Alive, Associated Press, Mar. 5, 2007., availa-
ble at http://money.cnn.com/2008/03/05/news/companies/deltaNWA.union.ap/
index.htm?postversion=2008030516.
203. See Exec. Order No. 13,205, 66 Fed. Reg. 15,011 (Mar. 9, 2001).
204. Thomas K. Grose, New Treaty Opens Trans-Atlantic Routes, U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REP. Feb. 27, 2008, at 28, available at http://www.usnews.com/articles/news/world/
2008/02/27/new-treaty-opens-trans-atlantic-air-routes.html.
205. Matt Welch, Fly the Frugal Skies, REASON MAG., Jan. 2005, available at http://
www.reason.com/news/show/36441.html.
206. See id.
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step in liberalizing restrictions among all nations on the globe. It is but
the catalyst for further agreements toward producing a truly seamless lib-
eralization and harmonization of all the world's aviation markets. Even
now the Association of South East Asia Nations (ASEAN) is in negotia-
tions to create a single open skies agreement to cover all operations in
South East Asia.20 7 Japan has now unilaterally opened twenty-three of
its airports to unrestricted access to foreign carriers. 20 8 Once the EU and
Asian nations harmonize, the consolidations between European carriers
will no longer be precluded by loss of routes and rights in Asia. As a
result, there will be virtually no limits on contracting labor from the low-
est-cost regions of the world to gain license and provide crews for aircraft
flying into any part of the world.
Countries and companies that plan to capitalize on these coming op-
portunities are already investing to establish the capability and reputation
to link the major commercial markets. Emirates airlines has made large
purchases of the world's largest commercial production aircraft, the
Airbus 380 which can carry over 500 people, and is building a new airport
in Dubai to match the capacity of London's Heathrow. 20 9 Emirates is
clearly positioning Dubai to become the new world center for a fully lib-
eralized system that links the Far East to the "Old" and "New" worlds.
India's Jet Airways and Kingfisher Airline are crafting similar expansion
strategies for Mumbai and Bangalore, India.
Here in the United States, the legal framework intended to provide
workers some sense of financial security seems to be doing anything but
that. Both United and Delta Airlines remain in operation today largely
as a result of eliminating billions of dollars of promised retirement bene-
fits for their workers. Also, laws greatly affecting aviation have been
changed in record time. For example, although a provision raising the
airline pilot retirement age by five years did not include any validating
medical studies by the FAA and was not even an element of the original
House version of the FAA Reauthorization Act in July 2007, it was sin-
gle-lined as the Fair Treatment for Experienced Pilots Act and run
through Presidential signature into law in just two days-despite the fact
that it was voted down previously as a part of the rejected Senate version
of the FAA Reauthorization Act in November 2007.210 Furthermore, the
chief economist for the Air Transport Association, which represents U.S.
airline owners, concedes that a new round of bankruptcies may become a
207. Joseph C. Anselmo, Squeezing Less Out of More, AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH.,
Mar. 10, 2008, at 38.
208. Id. at 38-39.
209. Id. at 38.
210. Sandra Arnoult, Congress Makes Progress on Pilot Retirement Bill, ATW DAILY
NEWS, Dec. 13, 2007, http://www.atwonline.com/news/story.html?storylD=11131.
Congress has since passed the Fair Treatment for Experienced Pilots Act, which
was subsequently codified at 49 U.S.C. § 44729.
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consideration to combat rising unit costs. 211
In 1996, after a fiery crash and ruinous revelations of safety violations,
the corporation known as ValueJet folded, only to have its assets resur-
rected under new management as AirTran.212 It is not beyond compre-
hension that, under the burden of ever rising oil prices and competitive
pressure from new foreign carriers undercutting the cost structure of even
the most frugal carriers in the United States today, management of ex-
isting U.S.-owned airlines might move beyond coping strategies em-
ployed in the past. Beyond mere alliance and code-share agreements
with established foreign carriers, or availing themselves of bankruptcy
debt and cost reductions, U.S. airlines could develop foreign subsidiaries
in rising EU or Asian countries and conduct the bulk of their operations
or growth through the subsidiary. Such tactics would be opposed by U.S.
labor claims of violation of contract rights to carry all passengers of the
parent company. This could drive the ultimate transformation where
U.S. carriers could potentially liquidate themselves, shed expensive labor,
and resurrect their physical assets under foreign registration and staffing.
The airline industry could transform to resemble the shipping industry
which commonly sails under flags of convenience. The U.S. Government
Accountability Office has noted that under full harmonization of laws, it
might become economically attractive for European carriers to restruc-
ture under registration in emerging nations with forty percent lower labor
costs.
2 13
Such dramatic change cannot happen in the next few years, but if the
stated goals of Open Skies Phase II are enacted into treaty in their most
liberal form, and EU-Asian liberalization and harmonization accelerate,
it is a potential outcome. And although such a labor dump is in direct
conflict with the guidelines of the OECD, those guides have no binding
authority. In fact, when attempting to craft rules for the European
Union's Societas Europeae, no binding provisions were reached on em-
ployment contracts or pension schemes.214 When the legal force of Open
Skies and its amendments force liberalization of the market, without pro-
viding mandates for either extended-term capital viability of air carriers
entering markets or clear and enforceable protections for labor, today's
financially paralyzed U.S. carriers could see themselves withered as
changing legislation allows airlines based or incorporated in the most
minimally regulated, taxed, and labor protective nations to fly in and
dominate our skies.
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